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THE GENIUS OF THE 1898 BANKRUPTCY ACT 
David A. Skeel, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 1 898 was a watershed year in American history. It is 
the end of 1 998 as I write , and one of the most widely reviewed 
books of the year is entitled simply 1 898.1 From th� vantage point 
of one century later, 1 898 is still the year when Teddy Roosevelt and 
the Rough Riders stormed San Juan Hill in Cuba. The famous 
charge not only assured Roosevelt a permanent place in the Ameri­
can imagination, but it also marked America ' s  coming of age as a 
nation. After a comparatively provincial start, America' s  economy 
had become one of the world 's  most important, and America's mili­
tary exploits in Cuba sen,ed as notice that America intended to be a 
serious player on the world stage. 
Although 1 898, the book, has nothing to say about bankruptcy, 
the year 1 898 was also a crucial one for bankruptcy. For the first 
century of the nation's existence, there had never been a stable 
bankruptcy law. Under its constitutional authority to enact 
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy,"2 Congress had passed 
three different bankruptcy laws-in 1 800," 1 84 1 ,4 and 1 867.5 But 
the life of each was, to borrow from Thomas Hobbes, "nasty, brut-
'' Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The author wishes to thank Bruce 
Markell  and the edi tors of the Bankruptcy Dn-elopments]ournal for their  invitation to write 
this Article and to Brad Hansen ,  Todd J.  Zywicki , and participants at the Creditors' and Debt­
ors' Rights section of the 1999 AALS annual meeting for helpful comments.  This Article is 
pan of a larger project e ntitled Bankruptcy Lawyers and the Politics o[American Bankruptcy 
1 See DA. VID TRA.XEL , 1898: THE BIRTH OF THE AMERJCA:-.1 CENTL'RY ( 1998). 
' U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
1 
See Act of Apr. 4, 1800,  ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 [hereinafter 1800 Act]. repealed by Act of 
Dec. 19 , 1803, ch . 6, 2 Stat .  248. 
' See Act of Aug. 1 9, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 [hereinafter 1841 Act], repealed by Act of 
:VIar. 3 ,  1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614. 
; See Act of Mar. 2, 1 867, ch.  176,  14 Stat. 5 17 [hereinafter 1867 Act], repealed by Act 
of june 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. 
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ish, and short."" Then in 1 898,  the clouds suddenly cleared (well ,  
not so suddenly, as we shall see) . Congress passed the 1 898 Act, and 
the rest is history. The 1 898 Act endured, and bankruptcy law has 
expanded-rather than contracted or been repealed-ever since. 
There is a standard story about the nineteenth century bank­
ruptcy laws that were just mentioned, and the story goes like this.' 
Under ordinary circumstances, there was not enough political sup­
port to keep a permanent bankruptcy law in place. But the nation 
was periodically thrown into turmoil by deep economic depressions. 
These depressions provoked loud cries for bankruptcy legislation. 
Congress responded to this pressure by passing bankruptcy laws, but 
it then repealed the laws when the depression passed and support 
for federal bankruptcy regulation receded. 
This story is true enough, as far as it goes, but i t  leaves several 
puzzles unanswered. First, it does not tell us why 1 898 was so spe­
cial .  How did the 1 898 Act emerge , and why did it  survive the post­
Act backlash that toppled each of its predecessors? Second, why did 
the Act take a form so different from the English bankruptcy system 
that developed under apparently similar circumstances across the 
Atlantic Ocean. In contrast to the pro-creditor, administrative Eng­
lish approach, the 1898 Act favored debtors '  interests in many re­
spects and assumed that the parties and their lawyers, rather than 
government officials, would run the bankruptcy system . 
This Article attempts to address each of the puzzles described 
above , and thus to pinpoint the "genius" of the 1 89 8  Act.8 Simply 
put, the Article argues that the genius of the Act came from the in­
teraction of creditor groups and federalism prior to the Act and the 
influence of the new bankruptcy bar after the Act.9 This analysis 
'' The 1 800 Act lasted over three years, the 1841 Act lasted less than two years, and the 
1867 Act lasted approximately eleven years. For the elates of repeal, see supra notes 3-S. 
7 The theme of the story, along with the importance of sectional rivalries to the bank­
ruptcy debates, is the central motif in CH.-\RLES WARREN, BANKRCPTCY I!\ U:\ITED ST.-\TES 
HISTORY (1935). It also figures prominently in the other most prominent book-length ac­
COlll1 ts of bankruptcy history. See F. REGIS NOEL, HISTORY OF THE BA:\KRCPTC\' L.->.\1' ( 1919); 
PETER j. COLD-lA:\, DEBTORS .-\:\0 CREDITORS I:\ A:VIERIC:A: lNSOL\'E!\CY, T:viPRISO:\\IE"\T FOR 
DEBT, .-\"\D B.-\"iKRCPTC:Y 1607-1 900 ( 1 974) . For a good survey of bankru p tcy histor·y in article 
form, see Charles Jordon Tabb, The Histoq of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United Sutes, 3 
.A.� I B . .>."i KR. hsT. L. REv. S (1995) .  
·' As those familiar with the corporate law li terature will recognize, the author bor­
rolvecl this term from Roberta Romano. See ROBERTA ROM.-\i\0, THE GF."iiL·s OF A:VIERIC.\"J 
CORPOR.\TE L\\1' ( 1993) 
'' 
Playing an important supporting role was an unusually long period of Republican 
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begins by describing the puzzles posed by the 1898 Act and then 
considers the reasons it proved to be special . 
II. Two PUZZLES OF THE 1898 ACT 
As mentioned at the outset, the standard story of American 
bankruptcy history is a tale of bust and boom. On this view, we have 
the Depression of 1793 to thank for the 1800 Bankruptcy Act; and 
the Panics of 1837, 1857, and 1893 to thank for the 1841, 1867, and 
1898 Acts . Once the first three acts had done their initial work and 
economic conditions improved, Congress repealed the federal legis­
lation and left insolvency law to the states .  
To say that the early bankruptcy laws responded to economic 
distress is, of course, to vastly oversimplify the politics of their pas­
sage . The 1800 Act was enacted and then repealed in the midst of a 
sustained struggle between the Federalists and the Jeffersonian 
Democrats over the future direction of the nation .10 The Federalist 
vision of a national economy based on trade rather than agriculture 
won out with the passage of the 1800 Act, only to meet a quick 
death when Jefferson was elected. The debates that led to the next 
act, in 1841, were in many respects the most memorable , with im­
portant speeches by Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, John Calhoun , 
and Thomas Benton spicing up proceedings that once again served 
as a referendum on the national economy.11 The 1867 Act was en­
acted in the aftermath of the Civil War, and Southerners' outrage at 
its implementation by "carpetbagging" federal judges would figure 
prominently in the debates that ultimately produced the 1898 Act. 
On most legislative issues, political differences are resolved 
over time ,  with one of the competing positions, or some stable 
compromise , winning out. Yet it took a hundred years for Congress 
control at the turn of the century. 
"' For an excellent account of this struggle as it influenced the eady bankruptcy de­
bates, see DRE.\1' R. MCCOY, THE. ELuSIVE REPUBLIC:: POLIIIC-\L ECO!'\O:VIY IN jE.FFERSO:'-JIA'-J 
A_'viERJC:.-'. l 78-84 ( 1980). 
" E\·en at the end of the centw-y, in the debates O\·er the 1 898 Act, both proponents 
and opponents of bankruptc: reform repeatedly quoted the speeches Webster and Clay gave 
in 1840. Proponents emphasized their support for federal bankruptcy legislation, whereas 
opponents focused on their support for an amendment that would have limited the act to 
voluntary bankruptcy only. St>e, t>.g., 25 COM'.. REc. 2878 (1 893) (statement of Rep. Brosius) 
(describing vVebster's support for federal bankruptcy); 31 CO'-JC. REc. 1940 ( 1898) 
(statement of Rep. Bailey) (stating that both Webster and Calhoun voted in favor of the Clay 
amendment that would ha,·e eliminated the involuntary bankruptcy provision in 1841). 
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to fall into line on bankruptcy. There are several reasons why the 
instability lasted so long. Most frequently mentioned is the long­
standing geographical conflict over federal bankruptcy law. 
vVhereas Northeastern lawmakers long advocated bankruptcy legis­
lation as essential to developing a national economy, Southern and 
Western lawmakers resisted, due to their constituents' fear that 
bankruptcy would threaten farmers' property and livelihood.12 The 
sectional differences roughly tracked, though not completely, the 
opposing views of the Federalists/Whigs (and later, Republicans) , 
most of whom supported bankruptcy, and the Jacksonian Demo­
crats , who did not. 
While these conflicts ensured that the bankruptcy debates 
would be sharply contested, what made matters worse was that law­
makers held not just two, but three distinct views on bankruptcy 
(and a wide range of additional variations) .'� Some lawmakers 
would vote for bankruptcy so long as it was strictly voluntary ( that is ,  
a debtor could file for bankruptcy but his creditors could not throw 
the debtor into bankruptcy involuntarily) . Others insisted on a 
"complete" bankruptcy law, with both voluntary and involuntary 
bankruptcy. And a final group opposed bankruptcy al together. 
The competing views exacerbated the difficulty of settling on a 
single ,  consistent approach to bankruptcy.''' Congress enacted a 
" As a concession to this sentiment, proponents of bankruptcy excluded farmers from 
involuntary bankruptcy, so that farmers could invoke the bankruptcy la1vs but could not be 
forced into bankruptcy by creditors. But farm advocates still were not satisfied. Even if farm­
ers were technically immune, they argued, Eastern wholesalers could file involuntar-y peti­
tions against the small retail merchants who sold crucial supplies to farme1·s. The merchants' 
trustees would then bring pressure on the merchants' farm debtors, with devastating effects 
on farmers. See 25 CONC. REC:. 2873-74 (1893) (statemem of Rep. Kyle) (hypothesizing 
about vulnerability of farmers if merchants forced into bankruptcy) .  
'' For a more detailed account, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankrupccy L:JHyers and rhe 
Shape of American Bankruptcy Law, 67 FORDHAM L REv. 497, 502-503 ( l 998). 
" The three views were unusually difficult to reconcile because there was no obvious 
relationship among them. One might think that complete bankruptcy would belong at one 
pole ,  voluntary in the middle, and opposition to bankruptcy at the other pole. But this was 
not the case. Many lawmakers who supported complete bankruptcy, for instance, viewed a 
voluntary-only law as even worse than no bankruptcy legislation at all. 
Drawing from social choice theory, the author has argued elsewhere that the multiplic­
ity ohiews reflected a voting perversity referred to as "cycling." See Skeel, supra note 1 3 . In 
the absence of stable ("single-peaked") legislative preferences, legislators shifted back and 
forth among the three options until the forces considered in Pans III and IV finally ushered 
in a new era of stability. For an argument that current bankruptcy legislation has often in­
volved partial defections from the overall bankruptcy system for the benefit of narrow interest 
groups, see Susan Block-Lieb, Congress' Temptation to DeFect: A Political and Economic 
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"complete" (although principally voluntary) bankruptcy law in 
1 84 1 ,  which after being repealed, was followed by more than twenty 
years without any bankruptcy law. Congress next passed the 1 867 
Act, which again included both voluntary and involuntary bank­
ruptcy. In the bankruptcy debates of the 1 880s and 1 890s, the three 
views continued to jostle for supremacy/" until the 1 898 Act settled 
the debate in favor of a "complete" bankruptcy system .  
The first and most obvious puzzle raised by the 1 898 Act i s  why 
1 898 was the year that the century-long game of musical chairs fi­
nally came to a stop.  Why did "voluntary-only" and "no bankruptcy" 
disappear as perceived alternatives? 
Commentators have had surprisingly little to say about this 
puzzle .  The only explanation one finds in the existing literature is 
that the expansion of commerce in the United States had made 
federal bankruptcy legislation inevitable . 16 On this view, proponents 
of an agrarian vision for America were the opponents of bank­
ruptcy, whereas the advocates of commerce supported it; and by the 
end of the nineteenth century, America had become a commercial 
nation once and for all. 
Focusing on the emergence of America as a commercial nation 
is a useful starting point, but it tells us little about how expanding 
commerce translated into a permanent bankruptcy law (and tells us 
even less about narrower questions such as why 1 898 was the magi­
cal year, rather than , say, 1 890 or 1 895). To better understand the 
significance of 1 898 ,  we will need a more particularized account of 
the political components of the 1 898 Act.17 
Developing a more precise account is even more crucial to ex­
plaining the second great puzzle of the 1 898 Act: its overall shape. 
Although it was promoted by creditors, the 1 898 Act was in many 
respects strikingly debtor-friendly-most obviously, in its generous 
discharge provisions.1s Another striking feature of the 1 898 Act was 
Theory ofLegislati1·e Resolutions to Financial Common Pool Problems, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 80 1 
( 1 99 7). 
�-. The House passed a voluntary bill (the "Bailey Bill") in 1 894, and the Senate Bill (the 
"Nelson Bill") that was reconciled with its very different House counterpart (the "Henderson 
Bill") permitted involuntary bankruptcy only in limited circumstances, such as fraudulent 
behavior by the debtor. 
1" For a particularly explicit adoption of this view, see Richard C. Sauer, Bankruptcy Law 
and the J'vfawring ofA.merican Capitalism, .55 OHIO ST. L.J. 291  ( 1 994). 
10 
See icl. 
" James Olmstead referred to the overall effect of the 1 898 Act as a 'jubilee" for debt-
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its minimalist administrative structure. The principal bankruptcy 
officials, referees and trustees, were paid on a fee basis, not by sal­
ary, and had only limited powers. 19 
This second puzzle, the general contours of the 1 898 Act, is 
best appreciated by contrast to the English bankruptcy framework 
that developed at roughly the same time. Throughout the nine­
teenth century, American lawmakers paid close attention to devel­
opments across the Atlantic .  English bankruptcy law was an obvious 
point of reference, because of both America's h istory as an English 
colony and England ' s  status as a preeminent world power. 
In one sense, England was the picture of stability by compari­
son to the American bankruptcy debates. Whereas the United 
States went long periods without federal bankruptcy, England had 
national bankruptcy laws on the books throughout the nineteenth 
century. But bankruptcy law was a source of considerable dissatis­
faction in England, as in the United States, which prompted a series 
of reforms over the course of the century. A very brief overview will 
give the flavor, and underscore the remarkable differences between 
English and American bankruptcy law. 
In 1 83 1 , Parliament enacted a bankruptcy law that introduced 
"officialism " to English bankruptcy law.�0 Previous bankruptcy acts 
had largely been creditor collection devices, invoked and pursued 
by individual creditors. Often referred to as "Lord Brougham ' s  Act" 
after the reformer most influential to i ts enactment, the English 
Bankruptcy Act of 1 83 1  replaced creditor control with a govern­
mental official who would administer the bankruptcy system. 
Rather than individual creditors, the bankruptcy official would be 
the principal overseer of the bankruptcy process. 
Although initially viewed as a success, the 1 83 1  Act had come 
under attack by the 1 850s. (Both the complaints and the principal 
proponents for reform will sound very similar to developments in  
America, as  we will see in the next part. ) The principal proponen ts 
for change were business organizations that had begun to form in 
ors i n  a much-cited attack on the Act. See James Monroe Olmstead, Bankruptcy: a Commer­
cial Regulation, 1.5 HA.RV. L. REv. 829, 843 (1 902). The legislative compromises on discharge 
are discussed in more detail in Part IV, infra. 
" For a discussion of the shift from salaried to fee-based officials, see infra notes 54-.58 
and corresponding text. 
''' The overview that follows is drawn from the lengthy discussion in V. MARKHAM 
LESTER, VICTOR!.\!'\ lNSOLVE!\CY: BAi'\KRUPTCY, lMPRISO:--IME:\T FOR DEBT, .-\:--10 COMPANY 
WI"iDI!\:G-UP I'i NI!'.:ETEENTH-CDiTCRYENGLA"iD 41-.59 ( 1 99.5). 
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the mid-nineteenth century.21 The most frequent complaint was 
cost. Administrative expenses, such as the cost of compensating the 
bankruptcy officials, ate up much of the bankruptcy estate, leaving 
little to distribute to creditors.22 
In response to these concerns, creditors ' groups drafted and 
began lobbying for a creditor-run system. Rather than a govern­
mental official, the creditors' proposal called for a creditor­
appointed trustee ( the "assignee") to oversee the bankruptcy proc­
ess. With the English Bankruptcy Act of 186 1, the creditors' groups 
agreed to a compromise reform.23 Buoyed by favorable reports 
about the success of the creditor-run system in Scotland,  creditors' 
groups then achieved a more complete victory in 1869. With the 
English Bankruptcy Act of 1869, "officialism" gave way to creditor 
control.�"� 
To the surprise of many, England's  Bankruptcy Act of 1869 
proved to be a complete failure.  In cases with small amounts at 
stake , creditors had little interest or incentive to participate .2" Many 
observers believed that debtors were not being scrutinized carefully 
enough, and there were loud complaints about a variety of abuses.2'; 
In 1883 ,  the pendulum swung once again . Although many creditor 
groups continued to lobby for a creditor-run system, the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1883 brought a return to "officialism."  The Bankruptcy Act 
of 1 883 authorized the Board of Trade to appoint an official re­
ceiver to conduct most of the administrative functions of the bank­
ruptcy case.27 Unlike its predecessors, the Bankruptcy Act of 1 883 
endured and established what are still the basic parameters of Eng­
lish bankruptcy law. 
The English system bears little resemblance to the framework 
" 
See, e.g., id. at 64-65 (discussing reforms proposed by merchants in 1840s). The or­
ganizations that figured most prominently in the debates of the late 1850s and 1860s were the 
National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, an organization of businessmen, 
politicians, doctors and lawyers and the Associated Chambers of Commerce. See id. at 123-
33. 
" 
See id. at 133. 
The English Bankruptcy Act of 1861 gave enhanced powers to the creditors' assignee, 
but omitted reforms to the appellate structure that creditors had sought. See id. at 143-44. 
'' 
See id. at 133-63. 
See icl. at 173-74. 
'" 
See icl. at 182-83. 
'-'-' 
See icl. at 195-97 (describing a Board of Trade bill that \vas subsequent1y enacted); sec 
also icl. at 204-203 (proffering adjustments to bill as it was enacted limiting some power of the 
Board of Trade) . 
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Congress adopted for the United States in 1898. The wide ranging 
authority of the official receiver-who personally investigates each 
debtor (generally without debtor's counsel present) , oversees the 
appointment of a trustee,  and makes recommendations to the 
court-gives the English system a pervasively governmental and 
administrative character. English bankruptcy also is far less gener­
ous to debtors than its American counterpart. A debtor who files 
for bankruptcy in England is subject to searching scrutiny, and 
courts routinely delay the debtor' s discharge for a period of several 
os years.·' 
Thus, shortly after England adopted a heavily administrative 
approach to bankruptcy, America moved in precisely the opposite 
direction .  American bankruptcy cases would be staffed by part-time 
officials, leaving the process largely to the parties and their lawyers. 
Unlike the almost punitive British system, the 1 89 8  Act was repeat­
edly defended as protecting the "honest but unfortunate" debtor. 
The question,  and the second great puzzle of 1898 ,  is :  why? 
Ill. BEFORE THE ACT: CREDITORS At'ID FEDERALISM 
To understand why the 1 898 Act proved permanent, and why 
American bankruptcy law traveled down a different path than its 
British counterpart, we need to consider two time periods: the pe­
riod leading up to the Act, and the years immediately after. In be­
tween, and connecting the "before" and "after," was an unusually 
long period of Republican control .  
The single most important interest group agitating for bank­
ruptcy legislation was unsecured creditors, particularly wholesale  
firms; and the most important development was the emergence of 
business organizations to  lobby for their interests . By 1 878, when 
Congress repealed the 1 867 Act, chambers of commerce and boards 
" For a recent account of these features of English bankruptcy law, see Douglas G. 
Boshkoff, Limited, Condicional, and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankrupccv 
Proceedings, 1 3 1  U. P.-\. L. REv. 69 (1982). American reformers have periodically sought to 
introduce English-sryle administrators and closer scrutiny of debtors to American bankruptcy 
law. An active, early proponent of this approach was William Douglas, who emphasized the 
\irtues of a careful study of debtors in a series of depression era articles. See William Clark et 
al., The Business Failures Project-A Problem in !'vlech odology, 39 Y.-\LE Lj. 101 3, 1 015-16 
( 1 930) (stating that in England, "[t]he antecedents of failure are delved into with marked 
thoroughness ... "). These reforms have invariablv failed in the United States, however, clue 
to the political factors we will consider in the remainder of the Article. 
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of trade had begun to form in numerous localities.29 Because these 
businessmen felt underprotected by state debtor-creditor laws, 
which often permitted debtors to favor relatives and other preferred 
creditors, the members of these groups had a strong, unified inter­
est in federal bankruptcy legislation.  30 
In 1 88 1 ,  these business organizations hired Judge John Lowell 
of Massachusetts to draft proposed legislation.31 At the first of three 
conventions held by their bankruptcy umbrella organization, the 
National Convention of Representatives of Commercial Bodies, the 
creditors enthusiastically endorsed Judge Lowell's handiwork.32 The 
Lowell bill was introduced in Congress in 1 882, and its supporters 
persuaded the Senate to pass it in 1 884, but that was as far as the 
legislation went. In 1 889, the creditors went back to the drawing 
board and hired Jay Torrey, a lawyer and later one of the Rough 
Riders,:1:1 to revise their proposed legislation. As with the Lowell Bill , 
the creditors gave their vigorous approval to Torrey's draft at a 
meeting of the National Convention of Representatives of Commer­
cial Bodies-this time in 1 889.'14 Torrey tirelessly campaigned for 
the Torrey Bill for the next nine years, until  Congress finally en­
acted it in revised form in 1898. :;5 
'" For a detailed discussion and statistical analysis of the emergence of these business 
organizations and a description of their influence on the 1 898 Act, see Bradley Hansen, 
Commercial Associations and the Creation of a National Economy: The Demand for Federal 
Bankruprcy Law, 72 Bus. HIST. REv. 86 (1998) . 
'" The treatment of preferential transfers was a heated issue throughout the bankruptcy 
debates. Whereas lawmakers sympathetic to federal bankruptcy legislation echoed creditors' 
insistence that preferences must be prohibited, some opponents of bankruptcy defended 
preferences. In their view, debtors had a moral obligation to prefer creditors such as family 
members over other creditors. See 17 CONC. R.Ec. 5134 ( 1886) (statement of Rep. Brown) 
(defending preferential payments as "debts of honor"); see also Robert Weisberg, Commer­
cial Morality, th e lvferchanc Character, and the Hisro1y of the Voidable Preference, 39 ST,\N. 
L. REV. 3 ( 1986) (characteri:;,ing the debate as reflecting confusion about the morality of 
commerce and bankruptcy). 
"' For O\"erviews of the legislative history described below, see, for example, WARREN, 
supra note 7, at 128-41 .  
'' See Hansen, supra note 29, at 98. 
·'' Perhaps inevitably, the limited prominence Torrey had in the nation at large came 
much less from his tireless promotion of bankruptcy legislation than from his exploits in 
Cuba. See Hansen, supra note 29, at 98. 
' '  
See Hanson, supra note 29, a t  99. 
,., Both proponents and opponents of the Torrey Bill referred with some regularity to 
his etlons on behalf of the bill. See, e.g. , 30 CoNe. REc. 628 (1897) (statement of Rep. 
Stewart) (stating, as a critic of the bill, "Mr. Torrey is a very sharp lawyer. He has been em­
ployed for a long time by interested parties"). 
330 BAt'\IKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSjOURNAL [Vol .  1 5  
What exactly were creditors looking for in a bankruptcy law? 
Like their counterparts in England, American business groups 
wanted bankruptcy to be run by creditors, not a government offi­
cial .3ti They believed that a debtor's assets should be distributed by a 
trustee chosen by the creditors rather than a permanent official . 37 
To the extent the law required new officials to act, in effect, as 
judges, these officials were given a set salary to prevent  some of the 
abuses of the 1 867 Act.3H Substantively, creditors were adamant that 
the legislation prohibit preferential transfers, and that it include in­
voluntary bankruptcy. They also wanted the law to be relatively 
tough on debtors, particularly those who had defrauded their credi­
tors. 
If creditors had been the only force in the bankruptcy delibera­
tions, the 1 898 Act might have looked much like English bank­
ruptcy law.39 But a cluster of opposing forces, unique to the United 
States, had a crucial restraining effect on the creditors' aspirations. 
These will be referred to as pro-debtor forces,10 which stem from the 
overlap between state and federal government in American lawmak­
ing (and the influence of the states even in the federal sphere) , 
" An 1 882 speech by Senator Ingalls, who had proposed a bankruptcy bill that would 
vest bankruptcy authority in the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts, underscores the a,­
finities between American and English creditors' groups. Ingalls contended that the Lowell 
Bill was drawn from England's Bankruptcy Act of 1 869, and emphasized the complaints in 
England about that legislation. See 1 4  CONG. REC. 38, 39 ( 1 882). Senator Hoar, the floor 
manager for the Lowell Bill, did not denv the connections. Instead, he insisted that the 
weaknesses of the English law had been addressed by the Lowell Bill. See id. at 40. 
" See generally id. at 38-42 (statements of Sen. Ingalls and Sen. Hoar) (debate between 
Senator Ingalls and the tloor manager of the original Lowell Bill, Senator Hoar, as to whether 
creditor control would be more effectual than judicial intervention). 
'' The 1 867 Act required debtors (or the bankruptcy estate) to pay set fees for filing 
and for a variety of tasks, such as notifying creditors. Many observers believed that the fees 
were needlessly multiplied by bankruptcy officials. In introducing the Lowell Bill, Senator 
Hoar extolled its reliance on salaries rather than fees as one of the most important advances 
of the Bill. See id. at 147. Although the bill did not initially specifY the amounts of the o£1i­
cials' salaries, proponents quickly inserted numbers: supervisors would receive $3000 per year 
and registers would receive $2000 per year. See id. at 43. 
The author does not suggest that creditors were the sole influence on the English 
bankruptcy law. To the contrar-y, Lester suggests that the inf1uence of creditor interest 
groups had waned by the time Parliament passed the Bankruptcy Act of 1 883, which set the 
tone of English bankruptcy law for the next century. See LESTER, supra note 20, at 208. The 
point, instead, is that the bill that American creditors proposed, the Lowell Bill, looked much 
more like the English system than the legislation that finally passed in 1 898. 
'" \:Vhether a lenient bankruptcy law genuinely ''favors" debtors is, of course, debatable. 
since creditors will respond by adjusting credit terms. But the lawmakers who voiced the 
\·iews described in the text saw their position as unequiYocally pro-debtor. 
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1 "i: d 1' "41 loose y as 1e era 1sm. 
The most obvious effect of federalism was to give voice to pro­
debtor views that might not otherwise have played a substantial 
role . 42 The agrarian and populist movements of the nineteenth cen­
tury were largely local in nature , but the influence of farmers at the 
state level quickly translated into national influence through the 
states' representatives in Congress . 43 In the bankruptcy debates, 
populist rhetoric surfaced in attacks on the harshness of the credi­
tors' proposals, and complaints that farmers and small merchants 
would be ruined. The Torrey Bill was frequently linked to North­
eastern sympathy for the gold standard, which populists attacked as 
devastating for their debtor constituen ts.14 
Closely related to agrarianism and populism was the states' 
rights movement. Throughout the nineteenth century, advocates of 
states' rights had criticized bankruptcy reform as federalizing issues 
that would otherwise be regulated by the states. Two particular 
concerns were the amount of litigation that would be shifted from 
state to federal courts and the specter of a vast new government bu-
r) reaucracy. 
" Federalism plays a similarly prominent role in Mark Roe's political account of the 
separation of ownership and control in publicly held U.S. corporations. See MARK J. ROE, 
STROr\G MA;'\AGERS, WEAK OWNERS 45-46 ( 1994). 
" As \\ill become clear below, the factors referred to as "federalism" include both ide­
ology and interest group acti\ity, as they were shaped by the sharing of authority between 
Congress and the states in the United States. For a more general discussion of interest group 
influence, see Dznid A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the F11ture of Public-Choice-Influenced 
Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REv. 64 7 ( 1997). 
11 
One of the best accounts of agrarianism and populism is RICHARD HOFST\DTER, THE 
Ac;E OF REFORM: FRO:VI BRYAN TO F.D.R. ( 1955). Local movements are particularly influential 
in the Senate, because each state has two senators, regardless of population. See, e.g., }\:VIES 
WILL'\RD HURST, TI-lE GROVVTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE L-'\W MAKERS 44-45 (1950). Moreover, 
state legislatures selected the states' senators throughout the nineteenth century. See TocldJ. 
Zywicki, Senators and Special InteresL'i: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth /Lmencl­
ment, 73 OR. L. REV. 1007, 1008 n.6 ( 1994) (citing U.S. COr\ST. art I , § 3, cl. 1 (amended in 
1913 with the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment)). Rural movements such as 
agrarianism and populism were aided in the House by subtle factors such as lawmakers' tar­
diness in reapportioning Congress to ref1ect increasing urbanization in the late nineteenth 
century. See HOFSTADTER, supra, at 116-17. 
" A good illustration, complete with a populist history of recent U.S. monetary legisla­
tion, is a speech by Representative Gunn in 1898. See 31 CONG. REC. 1911-13 ( 1898) 
(statement of Rep. Gunn). 
"' The apprehension about expanding the federal bureaucracy was shared even by 
many lawmakers who supported federal bankruptcy legislation. See, e.g., 14 CONG. REc. 168 
( 1882) (statement of Rep. Bayard). Concern for state authority had also been a major reason 
the first three federal bankruptcy laws did not include corporate bankruptcy. Opponents 
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Both of these factors-populist concerns for farmers and small 
merchants, and opposition to federalization-were reinforced by 
concerns (also shared by creditor groups) about the cost of the 
bankruptcy process. Even more than widespread allegations of 
fraud,  the costs of administration had left a bad taste in lawmakers' 
mouths after the 1867 Act. Over and over, opponents complained, 
and proponents conceded, that debtors' estates had been eaten up 
by administrative fees that compensated the officials handsomely 
but left little for anyone else. 46 Although cost is a concern in any 
bankruptcy regime,  it raised particularly serious problems in the 
United States due to the nation ' s  geography (which lawmakers con­
trasted to the compact geography of England) and the decentral­
ized n ature of the courts that would implement bankruptcy law. '' 
A final aspect of federalism is the role of banks. Federalism 
gives unusual clout to local banks ,  which have long parlayed their 
influence at the state level into legislative protections . '18 Given their 
interest in commerce, one might expect banks to have played a 
prominent, supportive role in the struggle for national bankruptcy 
legislation .  In actuality, they did not. 19 One reason for this , alluded 
to by lawmakers on both sides, was that local banks often were the 
including corporations i nsisted that, since states regulated other aspects of corporate law, 
states should also regulate corporate insolvency. For a detailed discussio n  on this issue , see 
Da\id A. Skeel, Jr. , Rethinking the Line Benveen Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 
7'2 TEX. L. REV . 471  ( 1994). 
'" Examples of such complaints are legion in the legislative h istory. For a relatively 
thorough discussion of the fees charged under the 1 867 Act and a defense of the proposed 
legislation as solving the problem, see 28 CONG. REc. 461 2  ( 1 896) ( state ment of Sen. Burton )  
( '" [T) h e  crowning evi l  of the law o f  1 867 was the enormous fee bil l  which the register i n  
bankruptcv and the assignee in bankruptcy were enabled to tax up against the estate of a 
bankrupt") .  See also Letter from Attorney General in Compliance with Senate Resolution of 
Feb. 24, 1878, S. EXEC. D oc. No. 1 9  ( 1 874) (reporting bankruptcy costs in  the United States 
under the 1 867 Act) . 
" See, e.g., 25 CONG. REC. app. at 539 ( 1 893) ( statement of Rep.  Lane) (contending 
that costs of the English system are 40% of all assets, and due to the differences in  geography, 
the costs in the U.S. would approach or exceed 75% of assets) . 
'' The United States has had an unusually fragmented banking system at least as far 
back as the National Bank Act of 1 863, which both reflected and reinforced the su·ength of 
local banks. Local banks are a key factor in Mark Roe 's influential poli ti cal analysis of U.S.  
corporate governance. See ROE, supra note 4 1 .  
"' Unlike merchants and other businesses, banks rarely appear i n  the lists o f  memorials 
for (or against) bankruptcy legislation.  A list of supporters of bankruptcy included in  the 
Congressional Record in 1 898, for instance, includes only one or two banks among the hun­
dreds of individuals and firms included. See 31 CONG . REc:. 1 904- 1 907 ( 1 898) ( lists appended 
to statement of Rep. Grosvenor ) .  
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beneficiaries of the preferential prebankruptcy transfers that pro­
ponents of federal bankruptcy were so anxious to prohibit."0 In ad­
dition, both local and national banks were less exposed in bank­
ruptcy than other creditors, because they could lend on a secured 
status. As a result, even national banks had less to gain from bank­
ruptcy legislation than might otherwise have been the case ;" 1 and 
many local banks were more sympathetic to the populist opposition 
to bankruptcy than to the creditors who supported it .  
As economic conditions deteriorated in the 1 890s, many of the 
lawmakers who were sympathetic to farmers and small merchants 
rallied behind proposals for bankruptcy law that included only vol­
untary bankruptcy.52 But creditors' groups were deadset against a 
voluntary-only bankruptcy law, which many saw as benefitting only 
' 3  debtors and,  therefore, worse than no bankruptcy law at all ." If 
creditors' groups wanted to pass a bankruptcy law that included 
both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy, however, they would 
have to respond to at least some of the concerns of the lawmakers 
sympathetic to farmers and small merchants. And this is precisely 
what they did. The give-and-take between creditors ' groups and the 
forces spawned by federalism can be seen in three important areas. 
The first is the administrative structure of bankruptcy. From their 
earliest proposals, creditors advocated a strikingly pared down ad­
ministrative structure. In place of the maze of fees required by the 
-
,, See, e.,rs- . 3 1  CO'\G_ REc. 1 898 ( 1 898) (statement of Rep. Bell )  (arguing that i t  i s  im­
portant to protect local bankers and wholesale merchants) . 
" National banks do generally appear to have supported federal bankruptcy legislation .  
But they did not figure in the debates in any significant way-their support was mixed. Thev 
clearly were more concerned about uniform federal standards on commercial law issues than 
they were wi th bankruptcy. For examples of bankers' views, see, for example, Proceedings of 
the Com·ention of the American Bankers Association National Convention 85 (Aug. 1 3 , 1 880) 
(statement by C. C. Bonney) (arguing that the "necessity of a National Bankruptcy Law is now 
almost universally admitted") . B ut see icl. at 90-9 1 (statement of T.H .  Hinchman) ( '' [The ] 
history of bankrupt laws show them to have been very unj ust and unsatisL1c: tory, subjecting 
both creditor and debtor to great unnecessary loss . " ) . 
" The highwater mark of this trend came i n  1 894, when a D emocrat-controlled House 
passed Senator Bailey's voluntary-only bankruptcy bill. See 26 Co;:-.;c. REC:. 7598 (1 894) . In 
later years, these lawmakers rallied around Senator Nelson 's bi l l ,  which included onlv a l im­
i ted involuntary bankruptcy option. The Nelson bil l  passed the Senate, but the in\'Oluntary 
provisions were tightened up in the conference with the H ouse, which had passed a version 
of the Torrey Bill .  See 31 CoNe. REc. 6296-97 ( 1 898) (statement of Sen. Nelson)  ( co mparing 
the two bil ls ) ;  see also icl. at 6299 (Senate passes conference committee bill that reconciled 
the two bills) . 
'" See, e.g., 28 CONG. REC. 4637 ( 1 896) (statement of Rep. Ray) (arguing that voluntary­
only bill would destroy credit ) . 
334 Bfu�KRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL [Vol. 1 5  
1 867 Act, the Lowell Bill called for a small group o f  salaried officials 
to oversee the process: assignees to act as trustee ,  registers to serve 
in a judicial capacity, and a group of regional supervisors to , as the 
name suggested, oversee the process as a whole .54 But even this 
structure, which echoed in telling respects the approach that soon 
gave way to officialism with the Bankruptcy Act of 1 883 in E ngland,55 
was rej ected as too costly and intrusive . The progression is telling. 
When the Lowell Bill was first introduced, Senator Hoar singled out 
the proposal to compensate bankruptcy officials on  a salary basis for 
special praise. Paying the supervisors and commissioners a salary, 
he argued, would eliminate any incentive to n ee dlessly complicate 
or prolong a bankruptcy case .'"6 The Torrey revision of the bill , as 
introduced in 1 890,  not only did away with the proposal to appoint 
overseers, but it also started a shift away from salaries and back to a 
fee-based approach. s; In the version that finally passed, the 1 898 
Act provided only for referees and trustees, and both would be paid 
strictly by fees. 58 
A second important concession to debtors and federalism was 
in the division of authority between federal and state lawmakers. 
Every creditor proposal from the Lowell Bill simply incorporated 
state law exemptions rather than imposing federal ones. This 
clearly was not by choice. Creditors would have been much happier 
to include uniform federal exemptions,  thus nullifying the generous 
exemptions of states such as Texas, but they recognized that federal 
exemptions would be politically fatal ."') Creditors also made conces­
sions to the state courts. Although the Lowell Bill  had vested rela­
tively expansive jurisdiction in the federal courts, creditors later 
' '  See 13 CONG. REc. 5268-74 ( 1 882)  (statement of Sen. Hoar) (setting forth bill ) ; see 
also id. at 5274-76 (describing and defending bi l l )  . 
. ,., As noted earlier,  the simi larities were not lost on lawmakers opposed to the legisla­
tion. See supra note 36. See also 15 CONG. REc:. 4308 ( 1 884) (memorial of Louisville Board 
of Trade) (stating that Lowell Bill was drawn from 1 867 Act and England ' s  Bankruptcy Acts of 
1861 and 1 869 ) . 
" 
See, e.g. , 1 4  CO:\G. REc. 147 ( 1 882)  (statement of Sen. Hoar) . 
. ,, The Torrey Bil l  proposed to pay commissioners, which were then called referees, 
$ 1 000 plus a $ 1 0  fee for each case. See 21 CONG. REC. 7566-68 ( 1 890) (synopsis of Torrey 
Bil l )  . 
. ,, The 1 898 Act provided for referees to be paid $ 1 0  plus 1 %  of di\iclencls paid. See 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1 898,  § 40, ch .  541 , 30 Stat. 544, 556. Trustees  received $5 plus speci­
fied percentages of assets distributed. See id. at § 48, 30 Stat. at 557-58.  
" See Proceeding·s of National Association of Credit lvfen, S .  Doc. No. 1 56, 55th Cong . ,  
1 5  ( 1 898) (Torrey characterizes federal exemptions as  politically infe asible) . 
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agreed to revlSlons that required trustees to bring preference and 
fraudulent conveyance actions in the local state courts . 60 
In the third area, involuntary bankruptcy and the scope of a 
debtor's  discharge , creditors dug in their heels much more strongly. 
Against opponents'  claims that struggling debtors would be thrown 
into bankruptcy by malicious creditors, the creditors' advocates in­
sisted that creditors had no incentive to wrongfully invoke bank­
ruptcy proceedings and that only with involuntary bankruptcy 
would creditors be assured a fair share of debtors' assets. Although 
creditors succeeded both in retaining involun tary bankruptcy, and 
in precluding discharge from debtors who committed fraud, they 
also made several important concessions. Unlike under the 1 867 
Act, a creditor vote would not be required as a prerequisite to dis­
charge.6 1  To protect against malicious or mistaken involuntary peti­
tions, several safeguards were added during the course of the de­
bates: the final bill required creditors to post a bond when they filed 
an involuntary petition; raised the minimum debt requirement to 
$ 1000; guaranteed the debtor a trial by jury; and weakened the pro­
visions that authorized the court to detain a debtor.62 In the ex­
traordinary negotiations that produced the final bill , creditors also 
agreed to eliminate several of the "acts of bankruptcy" that justified 
the filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition . 53 
It took still more for the 1 898 Act to pass. By 1 898,  the eco­
nomic downturn that began earlier in the decade had lasted so long 
'" See 14 CO"iG. REC. 1 69-1 70 ( 1 882)  (statement of Sen. Hoar) (proposing successfully 
amendment to require that suits by assignees be brought in  state court) ; Bankruptcy Act of 
1 898, § 23 (b ) , ch .  54 1 ,  30 Stat. 544, 552 ( requiring trustees to bring suit "in the courts where 
the bankrupt . . .  might have brought or prosecuted them ") . This requirement  quickly be­
came a point of contention after the 1 898 Act passed, as lawyers and referees complai ned bit­
terly about the cost and inconvenience of having to bring l i tigation in state court. 
"1 This concession appeared as early as the Lowell Bil l  and remained in place through 
the entire course of the debates. See 1 3  COl\G. REc. 5268-74 ( 1 882) (setting out bi l l ,  i nclud­
ing discharge requirements in § 82) . 
• , See Bankruptcy Act of 1 898, § 3 (e ) ,  ch .  541 , 30 Stat. 544, 547 (bond requirement) ; 
§ 19 ,  30 Stat. at 551  ( trial by jmy on issue of insolvency) ; § 9, 30 Stat. at 549 ( l imiting power to 
arrest bankrupts and authorizing detention if bankrupt is about to leave district) . Each of 
these provisions generated substantial discussion in the legislatiYe debates. 
"' As with much of the legislative debate, the conference committee that reconciled the 
House ( Henderson )  and Senate (Nelson)  bills focused almost entirely on the grounds for 
involun tary bankruptcy (the "acts of bankruptcy") and the bases for denying discharge. 
Three of the eight acts of bankruptcy were dropped in conference. An earl ier  concession 
had removed a very controversial ninth act of bankruptcy, which made failure for more than 
thirty clays to make payments on commercial paper a basis for an i nvoluntary filing.  See 3 1  
CO"iG. RE c  6297 ( 1 898) (statement o f  Sen. Nelson)  (describing changes t o  discharge ) . 
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that nearly everyone agreed on the need for some kind of bank­
ruptcy law. The creditors ' proposal might have lost out to a tempo­
rary voluntary bill if the Republicans hadn ' t  obtained control of 
both Congress and the presidency in 1898. "4 But pass i t  did. And 
from the struggle between creditors' groups and the forces of fed­
eralism came the features that would typify American bankruptcy 
law.';" In striking contrast to the tough , administrative British 
framework that emerged at the same time, American bankruptcy 
would have a minimalist administrative structure and comparatively 
generous provisions for the treatment and discharge of debtors. 
IV. AFTER THE ACT: THE BANKRUPTCY BAR 
According to an old saw about negotiations, if both parties 
complain about the outcome, the negotiations probably were suc­
cessful. By this standard, the 1898 Act splendidly reconciled the in­
terests of business with the pressures of American federalism. What 
to some was a law outrageously generous to debtors, others attacked 
fi6 as a heartless creditor collection measure . 
Despite these ( rather coun terin tui tive) signs of success, few o b­
servers would have predicted with confidence that the 1 898 Act was 
the one that would last. As with each of i ts predecessors,  the 1898 
Act faced an immediate legislative backlash. Opponents of the Act 
mounted vigorous campaigns for more than a decade after i ts en­
actment.67 Yet somehow the Act survived the onslaught. Much of 
the genius of the 1898 Act lay in compromises we have seen. But 
" '  Sec Bradley Hansen ,  The Political Economy of Bankruptcy: The I 898 Act to Establish 
A Uniform System of Banknzptcy, ESSAYS IN ECO:\OMIC AND BCS!i\ESS H ISTORY ( 1 997)  
(discussing the signifi cance of Republican control to passage of 1 898 Act) . As noted earlier, 
the bill  that passed the Senate ( the Nelson Bill) had very restrictive requirements for i nvo lun­
tary bankruptcy, and was favored by many lawmakers who insisted on  a voluntary-only  bil l .  
,,., The bill  that finally passed was a remarkably balanced compromise between the 
debtOr-friendly Senate Bil l  and the House Bi l l ,  which creditors preferred. The one dissenting 
voice on the conference committee was Representative Terry, who was opposed to any bank­
ruptcy law, and even he lauded the efforts of the conference committee. See 3 1  CONG. REc. 
6429 ( 1 898) (statement of Rep .  Terry) (stating that many of the b i l l ' s  most objectionable fea­
tures had been removed) .  
''' Compare Olmstead, supra note 1 8  ( criti cizing the bill  as a n  unprecedented 'jubilee" 
for debtors) with H. REP. No. 4397 ( 1 905) Uudiciary Committee Report cal l ing for repeal of 
1 898 Act  because creditOrs are simply us ing i t  for collection ) .  
'·' I n  1 905,  the judiciary Committee issued a report calling for repeal, and a minori ty of 
the Committee had reached the same conclusion in 1 902.  See H .  REP. No. 4397, at 1 ( 1 905) 
(majority calls for repeal) ;  H. REP. No. 1 698, at 3 ( 1 902)  (minority advocates repeal ) . 
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the rest of i ts genius emerged only after the passage of the Act in 
1 898 ."R 
One factor  in the Act 's  survival was simple party politics. Just as 
Republican control had helped ensure passage of the Act in 1 898,  
continued Republican control diminished the threat of repeal. 
Under McKinley and Roosevelt, the Republicans held the VVhite 
House until 1 9 1 2; and their control extended to both houses of 
Congress until the Democrats finally regained the House in 1 9 1 0 .  
With the party that had advocated bankruptcy reform very much in 
charge , repeal was much less likely than it would have been in an 
era of Democratic ascendancy. 
It is important not to overstate the significance of Republican 
control. Although bankruptcy had long been a Republican priority, 
Republicans  were not monolithically in favor of bankruptcy, as evi­
denced by the vote for repeal by a Republican controlled Judiciary 
Committee in 1 905. Moreover, had Republican proponents 
changed their minds about bankruptcy, they wouldn ' t  have been 
the first majority party to do so. In 1 843, their predecessors , the 
VVhig party, led the charge for repeal of the bankruptcy law they 
had pushed through only two years earlier. ti'l 
Rather than directly assuring the permanence of the 1898 Act, 
the real significance of Republican control was transitional. It was 
the bankruptcy bar that added the final piece of the bankruptcy 
puzzle, and Republican control made this possible . 70 To see how, 
recall for a moment the pared down administrative structure of the 
1 898 Act. Unlike the British system ,  with its powerful administrator,  
the 1 898 Act called for trustees and referees with limited powers; 
the Act's fee-based compensation discouraged them from actively 
intervening, since spending additional time on a case would only 
make sense if it produced substantial new assets and thus additional 
fees. 71 In theory, this minimalist structure left the process to the 
"' In another context, Jon Macey has described the role legislation plays in  shaping sub­
sequent interest group support as the legislation 's  "ex ante wiring. " See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECO:\. & 
ORG. 93 ( 1 992) .  The developments described below can be seen as a very similar phenome­
non.  
"' For a discussion,  see Skeel, supra note 1 3 ,  at 503. 
'" The discussion that follows draws from and expands on my discussion of the role of 
the bankruptcy bar in Skeel, su pra note 1 3 .  
" Fee-based compensation also may have discouraged referees from denying a debtor's 
discharge, given that dismissing a debtor's peti tion would also sacrifice the referee's abil ity to 
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parties themselves-that is, debtors and their creditors .  The more 
immediate reality, however, was that it created an urgent  need for a 
bankruptcy bar. With creditors and debtors jousting over the pro­
priety of bankruptcy and discharge , and the referee playing a 
somewhat limited role, the one constant was that everyone needed a 
lawyer.n 
Because there had not been a federal bankruptcy law in place 
for two decades, the bankruptcy bar did not even exist when Presi­
dent McKinley signed the new legislation into law in 1 898.  This is 
where Republican control proved especially important. Republican 
control kept the 1 898 Act in place long enough for the bankruptcy 
bar to get on its feet. By the time the Republicans finally slipped 
-3 from power after 1 9 1 0, '  the bankruptcy referees and bar that owed 
their existence to the Act were now in a position to h elp make sure 
that the Act was not repealed. 
Perhaps the best evidence of the growing influence of the bar is 
in the legislative hearings on bankruptcy in the first decade of the 
century. Although Congress continued to debate whether the Act 
should stay or go,74 leading members of the ban kruptcy bar such as 
Edwin Brandenburg and Frank Remington played an increasingly 
prominent role as sources of expertise . 75 The credibility they 
(Remington especially) developed through repeated appearances 
before the Judiciary Committee gave them particular influence on 
technical issues and, over time,  reduced the likelihood that the Ju­
diciary Committee would call on Congress to repeal the Act. 76 
look to the estate for fees. 
" A few lawmakers commented on the demand for lawyers that the proposed legislation  
would create. But  most of the comments were simply off-handed attacks on  the  legislation as 
a whole. See, e.g., 28 CONG. REc. 4752 ( 1 896) (statement of Rep. Talbert) . 
" The D emocrats took control of the House in 1 9 1 0. It was n o t  unti l  1 9 1 2, when 
vVoodrmv vVilson won the presidency, that the balance of power truly shifted i n  a Democratic 
direction .  
" An ongoing concern for proponents of bankruptcy was that their efforts to secure 
minor amendments to the Act would boomerang and lead to a movement  to repeal the legis­
lation altogether. The fear was legitimate, as the advocates of repeal mobi lized each time 
Congress considered amendments .  See, e.g., 35 COl': C .  REc:. 6957-58 ( 1 902)  (proposed 
amendment that would simply repeal the Act failed) . 
" Brandenburg wrote the first complete treatise on the new Bankruptcy Act, and Rem­
ington followed with a similarly complete treatise thereafter. See EDWIN BRA'\DE:\BCRC, 
BR\:-JDE:\BL'RC ON BANKRUPTCY ( 1 89 8 ) ; FR\NK RE:V!I'\GTON,  REY!INGTO'\ ON R\NKRUPTC:Y 
( 1 908) . 
'" In the early years of the Act, Remington appeared at nearly every Judiciary Commit­
tee hearing. Bv the end of the first decade, he often acted as de fac to bankruptcy expert, i n-
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In addition to individual representatives, bankruptcy referees 
figured prominently in the lobbying process,;; and the bankruptcy 
bar exerted influence through organizations such as the Commer­
cial Law League and the American Bar Association .;s Their princi­
pal organized ally was the National Association of Credit Men,  most 
of whose members worked in firms' credit departments and which 
was a successor of sorts to the business groups that had originally 
lobbied for the 1 898 Act.;9 These organizations worked together so 
closely, and over so many years, that they eventually formalized their 
relationship by forming the National Bankruptcy Conference in the 
early years of the New Deal.80 
The longterm effect of the emergence of a stable bankruptcy 
bar was to solidify the coalition in favor of a permanent bankruptcy 
law. Even with continued creditor support and important conces­
sions to the proponents of debtors ' interests, the future of the 1 898 
Act was uncertain for well over a decade. With each passing year, 
however, the stake of bankruptcy lawyers and referees in its contin­
ued existence increased, as did their ability to contribute to that 
goal . Over time, the bankruptcy bar would become the single most 
important influence on the evolution of U .S. bankruptcy law. Law­
yers have assured that U.S. bankruptcy practice will continue to be 
dominated by the parties and their lawyers, rather than a govern-
terjecting repeatedly to clarifY fine points about bankruptcy law. See, e.g., Hearings Before 
the S u bcommiuee of the Committee on the judiciary, United States Senate, on the Bill I-I.R. 
20575, 6 1 st Cong., 8 ( 1 9 1  0) (statement of Harold Remington)  (characterizing proposed 
amendments as simply effectuating the original intent of the 1 903 amendments) . 
" See, e.g., 43 CoNe . REC. 2006 ( 1909) (statement of Rep .  Sherley) (defending refe­
rees' support for bankruptcy amendments) . 
" The Commercial Law League was formed in 1 895 by a group of commercial lawyers. 
For a description of the CLLA's early h istory, see MORRIS WEISMAN, A HISTORY OF THE 
COMM ERCIAL L\W LEAGUE OF A,vJERIC.-'1. 1-5 ( 1 976) .  Although the League was concerned with 
a variety of commercial law issues ( including the movement for uniform commercial laws) , 
bankruptcy quickly became a dominant concern. The American Bar Association elated back 
to 1 878,  and took positions on a wide range of legal issues. The bar exerted influence 
through the Committee on Commercial Law, whose jurisdiction included bankruptcy. 
''' The NACM was formed in 1 896. Most of i ts members came from the credit depart­
ments of business firms. 
"' The NACM, CLLA, and ABA, along with a group of law professors and bankruptcy 
lawvers, formed the 1'\ational Bankruptcy Conference in 1 934 in an effort to address a wide 
range of issues (many of them technical in nature) that they felt had been neglected in the 
early New D eal reforms. The National Bankruptcy Conference had an enormous in fluence 
over the shape of the Chandler Act of 1 938. For a brief overview by one of its most pro mi­
nent members. see Reuben H unt, The Progress of the Chandler Bankruptcy Bill, 42 C0'\1 . LJ .  
1 95 ( 1 937) 
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mental official ,  by thwarting proposals (most prominently, i n  the 
1 930s and again in the 1 970s) to introduce an English-style gov­
ernmental overseer. They also have continually pushed to expand 
the scope of the bankruptcy laws.81 
The influence of the general bankruptcy bar stands in striking 
contrast to the corporate reorganization bar that h ad emerged in 
the late nineteenth century. The reorganization bar was called into 
existence by the waves of railroad failures in the 1 870s and thereaf­
ter. Unlike the general bankruptcy bar, which was far from elite 
(and in fact, was often controversial due to allegations of bank­
ruptcy "rings") , the reorganization bar included m any of the most 
prominent members of the greatest New York law firms.H2 Yet, when 
the New Deal reformers overhauled the bankruptcy laws in  the 
1 930s, i t  was the reorganization bar that they destroyed .  The gen­
eral bankruptcy bar was not only protected, but in  some respects 
expanded its turf. Centered on Wall Street, corporate reorganiza­
tion practice fell prey to the wave of anti-Wall Street bias unleashed 
during the New Deal .8� Thanks to  the much more broad-based 
bankruptcy bar, and the concessions already made to debtor inter­
ests, the 1 898 Act survived the regulatory impulses of the New Deal . 
V. CONCLUSION 
If we compare the U.S .  bankruptcy laws to those of the nation ' s  
original sovereign, England, the contrast could h ardly b e  starker. 
Unlike the heavily administrative English system, U .S .  bankruptcy 
law is driven by private parties and their lawyers; the English system 
discourages filing and discharge, whereas the U.S .  system tends to 
' 1  See Skeel ,  supra note 1 3. There is an obvious analogy between bankruptcy lawyers' 
influence over bankruptcy law and the l i terature exploring agency bureaucrats' role i n  pro­
tecting  and expanding their agency. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. NISKANE N ,  BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ( 1 9 7 1 )  (emphasizing agencies '  incentive to maximize their 
budgets) ; Wil l iam A. Niskanen ,  A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Govern­
ment, in THE BlJDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRA.T: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE (Andre Blais & 
Stephanie Dion,  eels. ,  1 99 1 )  (revising earlier analysis) . 
'' The best known example is Paul Cravath ,  the namesake of Cravath, Swaine & Moore. 
His similarly prominent successor, Robert Swaine,  chronicled the firm' s  rise and i ts extensi\·e 
i nvolvement in early reorganization practice in ROBERT T. SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM A:\D 
ITS PREDECESSORS: 1 8 1 9- 1 947 ( 1 9 46-48) .  
' 1  For an extensive discussion of the effect  of the New Deal reforms o n  corporate reor­
ganization and the reorganization bar, see David A. Skeel, Jr. , An Evolutionary Theoq of 
Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 5 1  VAND .  L.  REV . 1 325, 1 361 -72 ( 1 998) . 
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encourage them. 
The year that will forever be associated with the distinctive U .S .  
system i s  1 898 .  That was the year Congress enacted the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1 898,  which ended a century of instability and made federal 
bankruptcy law a permanent fixture on the legislative landscape .  
This Article contends that the "genius" of the 1 898 Act can be 
explained by a small group of political factors. The rise of business 
organizations at the end of the nineteenth century provided the 
impetus, and the Act was shaped by the interaction of these credi­
tors' interests and the countervailing pressures of American federal­
ism . Thanks to a lengthy period of Republican control, the Act re­
mained in place long enough to spawn a bankruptcy bar. The bar 
then solidified the coalition supporting the Act. 
In retrospect, the forces that came together in 1 898 have so 
great an air of necessity that it seems hard to imagine bankruptcy 
law taking any other form than the approach that finally passed. 
Perhaps economic expansion plus the American political frame­
work led inescapably to a lawyer-driven bankruptcy framework 
rather than an administrative one, but perhaps not. Had insolvency 
remained the province of the states until the New Deal,84 for in­
stance, one could imagine the New Deal reformers devising an ad­
ministrative approach to bankruptcy-possibly tied to administrative 
reforms such as welfare and social security. 
Speculation of this sort is, of course, just that-speculation .  
The important point i s  that, at  the centennial of  the 1 898 Act ' s  en­
actment, we now can see much more clearly than the Act 's  creators 
just how special the bankruptcy legislation was. What made the Act 
special was a unique combination of creditors, American federalism 
and, as always in the United States, the lawyers that soon followed.  
' '  If the  Supreme Court had concluded in 1 902 that the  Act's incorporation of state law 
exemptions was unconstitutionally nonuniform, the possibil i ty of repeal would have been far 
greater than i t  proved to be. As i t  was, the Court upheld this key compromise with advocates 
of state regulation. See Hanover Nat'! Bank v. Moyses, 1 86 U.S.  1 8 1 ,  1 88 ( 1 902) (holding that 
uniformity requires only geographi cal, not personal, uniformity) . 
